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Results 
The model contains 5 state variables, 13 exogenous parameter varia-
bles, 21 endogenous (calculated) parameters and 10 rates of change. 
Three principal feedback loops (a peer initiation epidemic loop, a 
global availability loop, and a personal accessibility loop) contribute 
to the nonlinear growth patterns in nonmedical opioid initiation and 
use. Peer initiation is modeled as the infection of a susceptible popu-
lation by peers. Global availability of opioids for nonmedical use de-
pends on the number of current opioid users and how much free 
leftover medicine they obtain from prescription holders. When avail-
ability diminishes, reduced personal accessibility requires transitions 
Background 
The number of overdose deaths involving opioids tripled between 
1999 and 2006 in the US, rising to 14,800 in 2008 (Warner et al. 
2011). As evidenced by the high fraction of opioid overdose dece-
dents without prescriptions (Hall et al. 2008), nonmedical use of 
pharmaceutical opioids plays a significant role in the prevalence of 
overdose deaths. Leftover opioid prescriptions are likely involved in 
much of this diversion (Compton and Volkow 2006). Studies suggest 
that there is a large reservoir of unused opioids stored in homes 
(Bates et al. 2011; Gilson 2012), and the high fraction of individuals 
receiving drugs for free from friends and family as reported in the 
NSDUH (SAMHSA 2012) is likely to be strongly correlated with the 
size of this reservoir. 
Methods 
Drawing from empirical data and a panel of experts, a system dy-
namics simulation was developed to reproduce historical trends in 
nonmedical use of pharmaceutical opioids in the United States. Da-
ta to support assumptions and model parameters were drawn from 
publicly available sources in the literature.  Data on initiation and 
nonmedical use were obtained from the NSDUH for the years 1995 
to 2011. System dynamics is a simulation method in which complex 
relationships and feedback loops are specified and mathematically 
formalized. The resultant set of differential equations was calibrat-
ed to replicate opioid use data from 1995-2005, used to predict be-
havior from 2006 to 2011, and to evaluate policy interventions.   
to paying for opioids. Compelling susceptible non-users to resist initi-
ation (e.g. Gosin et al. 2003) was more effective in reducing nonmed-
ical use than compelling prescription holders not to share their medi-
cines (e.g. FDA 2013), and reducing global availability through pre-
scription take back events (e.g. DEA 2012).  
Conclusion 
The current model offers a formalized model of a common pathway 
to nonmedical opioid initiation and provides a tool for comparing 
the impact of multiple policy interventions.  System dynamics mod-
eling brings insights on the global dynamics of nonmedical opioid 
use and can be used to inform policy interventions to ameliorate 
the associated public health problems.  
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Contact 
A susceptible person makes contact with infectious 
people at a given rate. 
Access 
To initiate drug use a susceptible person 
must have access to opioids. 
Infectivity 
The idea of using opioids is 
infectious and spreads from 
recreational users to non-
users.  Higher infectivity, 
more initiation. 
Infection 
Susceptible nonusers 
initiate opioid use 
High Demand 
People with use 
disorders have 
high demand for 
free opioids. 
 Local Free  
Supply 
High users only 
have free access to 
a fraction of global 
supply, through 
their own family 
and friends. 
Supply 
Demand 
Running Out 
People with use dis-
orders may exhaust 
the local free supply. 
Transition to Paying 
When a person with a use disorder exhausts her 
local free  supply, she begins paying for opioids. 
Use Disorders 
Over time some rec-
reational users de-
velop use disorders. 
Intervention: Reduce % Willing to Share 
Reducing people 
willing to share 
prescriptions by 
25% affects glob-
al supply and ini-
tiation by reduc-
ing access to opi-
oids for new ini-
tiates.   
The effect on initiation is mitigated because initiates 
are likely to know several prescription holders, but 
then amplified by positive feedback. 
Intervention: Reduce Infectivity 
A 25% decrease 
in the infectivity 
of opioid use re-
sults in a dra-
matic decrease 
in the number 
of nonmedical 
users.  This is 
largely due to 
positive feedback.   
Lower initiation —> Fewer recreational users —> 
Fewer contacts with nonusers —> Lower initiation. 
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Intervention: Reduce Global Supply 
Global supply is 
reduced through 
DEA Take Back 
Days. Supply is 
reduced by 100 
million dosage 
units per year. 
Supply con-
striction causes 
recreational users to quit sooner and people with use 
disorders to start paying sooner. The effect is small 
because global supply remains plentiful. 
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Calibration and Prediction 
Total Nonmedical Users People with Use Disorder 
Total Initiates 
Blue trace shows empirical data, red 
trace shows model output.  Prediction 
errors (MAPE): 
 Nonmedical Users = 3.76% 
 Initiates = 6.13% 
 Use Disorder = 3.47% 
We report development of a systems level dynamic model of initia-
tion and nonmedical use of pharmaceutical opioids in the US. The 
model calibrated to 1995-2005 National Survey of Drug Use and 
Health (NSDUH) data, predicts 2006-2011 data well. Preliminary find-
ings indicate that interventions which reduce the perceived attrac-
tiveness of opioids for recreational use may be able to reduce initia-
tion and nonmedical use most significantly, while supply restriction 
effected through drug take back days and prescribing changes may 
have more modest effects. We argue that system dynamics is an 
effective approach for evaluating potential interventions to this com-
plex system where the use of pharmaceutical opioids to treat pain is 
fraught with undesirable distal outcomes.  
Discussion 
The relative impact of the three interventions simulated can not be 
explained by feedback alone as all three interventions are amplified 
by positive feedback loops.  The infectivity intervention reduces the 
initiate rate by 25%, and this reduction is immediately amplified by 
feedback.  The willingness to share intervention impacts both the in-
fection loop and the global availability loop, but the 25% reduction is 
indirect.  Reducing by 25% the number of people who are willing to 
share prescriptions only reduces the likelihood that a potential initia-
tor will know at least one prescription holder by a small percentage.  
This likelihood is based on a binomial distribution and is large when a 
large fraction of the population has prescriptions.  So the impact on 
initiation and global supply is much smaller than 25%.  This smaller 
reduction is amplified by positive feedback, which suggests that lim-
iting sharing is an intervention with leverage. Supply reduction 
through prescription take back days is the least effective strategy pri-
marily because the reservoir of leftover medicines is so large that the 
reduction implemented did not cause the system to be supply con-
strained.  
